Toward the Identification of Priority Investments and Strategies for Developing Food Markets and Smallholder Agriculture


GISAMA Report 1.A presented at BMGF
Seattle, August 26-27, 2009

Organization of presentation:

1. What are the major problems?
2. Main findings
3. Policy implications (“take-away messages”)
4. Elements of the way forward (focusing on “first order” issues)
Current thinking on “strategy”

- Consensus about need for greater investment in public goods (infrastructure, extension, crop science) to improve functioning of markets

- Continuing debate regarding what constitutes the right “enabling environment”
  - Appropriate role of government in markets
  - 3 alternative “visions”: each one affecting behavior and incentives of private sector

Competing models of roles of state and private sector in food markets:

**Model 1**
- State role limited to:
  - Public goods investment
  - Regulatory framework
  - Strengthening of institutions / defense of property rights
  - Policies supportive of private sector entry and competition

**Model 2**
- Primary reliance on markets
  - But role for rules-based state operations
    - e.g., buffer stock release to defend stated ceiling price
    - Marketing board purchases at stated floor price announced in advance
    - Transparent rules for initiating state imports

**Model 3**
- Role for markets and discretionary state intervention
  - Based on premise that private sector cannot ensure adequate food supplies in response to production shortfalls
  - Justification for unconstrained role for state interventions in markets to correct for market failures
Informing the debate

- Many of the debates about the “right” strategy can be informed by a solid empirical understanding of how rural economies and markets work

Fact #1

- Most rural farm households are buyers of maize (or net buyers)
Do these findings reflecting a problem of access to markets? Premise: if markets could be developed better, many more smallholders would be growing more for the market.
Farmers’ access to markets

Number of traders buying maize from farmers in village – 2009 Maize Value Chain Study

![Bar chart showing the number of traders buying maize from farmers in Kenya and Zambia.](chart.jpg)

Legend:
- Green bars represent Kenya.
- Blue bars represent Zambia.
Farmers’ access to markets

- Median distance travelled by farmers to point of maize sale in Kenya = 0
- Importance of cell phone ownership on ability to find buyers

Main reasons why smallholders don’t sell to markets:

- Lack of productive assets – ploughs, harrows, ox-carts, know-how
- Constraints on access to land

→ can’t produce a marketable surplus
Farm size distribution:
Small farm sector

Characteristics of smallholder farmers,
Zambia 2003/04

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N=</th>
<th>Farm size (ha)</th>
<th>Asset values (US$)</th>
<th>Gr. Rev., maize sales (US$)</th>
<th>Gr. Rev., crop sales (US$)</th>
<th>Total hh income (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top 50% of maize sales</td>
<td>31,328</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1,132</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>1163</td>
<td>2,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2%)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rest of maize sellers</td>
<td>328,561</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(26%)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households not selling maize</td>
<td>907,255</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>415</td>
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<tr>
<td>(72%)</td>
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</table>
Rural population growth rates

Share of urban population in total population, 1968 and 1998
Are imported wheat and rice crowding out domestically-produced grain?

- 3.6% annual growth in cereal imports to SSA
- Of total grain imports by African countries, only 5% is produced by African farmers
- Growth in urban demand is being met mainly by imported wheat and rice

Wheat product consumption trends - Zambia
Diversification of consumption patterns due to increasing wheat imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban center</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th>Rice</th>
<th>Cassava</th>
<th>% share of total food budget</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo Province</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northern Mozambique*</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>2007/8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitwe</td>
<td>2007/8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansa</td>
<td>2007/8</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*includes Nampula city

Importance of Imported Staples in Nairobi Expenditure Patterns

Figure 7: Expenditure on Primary Staples (KSh per a.e/month)
Take-away message #1

• Most rural farm households are buyers of maize (or net buyers)
  ▪ 2% of households account for 50% of marketed grain surplus
  ▪ High food prices:
    • highly concentrated benefits
    • Adversely affects the rural poor
    • Most likely impede small farm diversification into higher-valued activities

Take-away message #2

- Demand for food is rising rapidly, leading to secular rise in food prices to import parity
  - More than 50% of Africa’s population will be urban by 2015.
    – 2000: 10 farm households feed 7 non-farm households
    – 2020: 10 farm households feed 16 non-farm households
Take-away message #3

- **Demand for quality land is skyrocketing**
  - Demand for agricultural land = derived demand for food
  - Rapid urbanization of Africa resulting in non-linear growth in demand for food
Why do food prices often soar above import parity?

Maize prices vs. import parity: Lilongwe, Malawi
Maize prices vs. import parity: Lusaka, Zambia

Market failures are often caused by government failure

- National food production shortfall anticipated
- Who’s going to import? And how much?
- State announces plan to import X tons
- Supplies dwindle; prices skyrocket
- State incurs delays in contracting for imports
- Private traders sit on sidelines
Market failures are often caused by government failure

National food production shortfall anticipated → Who’s going to import? And how much? → State announces plan to import X tons

Supplies dwindle; prices skyrocket
“EVIDENCE THAT MARKETS FAIL!” → State incurs delays in contracting for imports → Private traders sit on sidelines

Take-away #4: Need to redress the problems of credible commitment/trust

Sources of policy unpredictability:
- Export bans, import quotas (year to year & within year)
- Uncertainty over whether government will import and sell at below-market prices to millers
  - recent examples: Zambia, Malawi, Kenya 2008/09
- Quantities and prices at which the MBs buy and sell are often not disclosed
Under-provision of seasonal storage:

5 main reasons:

1. Threat of grain confiscation (e.g., Malawi, Ethiopia, Kenya)
2. In areas with staggered harvest seasons (Kenya, Uganda, N. Tanz) relatively small seasonal price rises
3. Unpredictable government operations
4. Local banks find grain markets very risky compared to government T-bills
5. Lack of moisture content quality standards

Outcomes of under-provision of seasonal storage:

1. Greater seasonal price variability than would otherwise occur
2. Most grain surpluses sold off and transported to deficit areas early in season
3. Areas that are surplus after harvest turn deficit in the hunger season as deficit households turn to the market for food
4. Circuitous rural-urban-rural flow of maize – redundant transport costs and higher marketing margins
5. Informal markets dry up → structure of milling and retailing becomes highly concentrated (p. 70)
Percentage of urban consumers indicating that maize grain is unavailable to buy in local markets, four cities in Zambia, 2007/08

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
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<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>47.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kitwe</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansa</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>64.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kasama</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Take-away message #5

1. Take steps to ensure availability of grain circulating year-round in informal markets
Take-away #6: Making the demand for grain more elastic

- How to ensure that prices don’t plunge when supply expands
- The elasticity of demand is a function of government policy and public investment patterns
Slope of demand curve influenced by:

- transport infrastructure
- incentives for investment in storage
- supporting alt. end use industries
- finance available to traders (e.g., warehouse receipt systems)
- trade / policy barriers (e.g., export bans, import tariffs)

MOST OF THESE FACTORS ARE INFLUENCED BY GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR
Conclusions and Implications for Strategy
Main problems with staple food markets

1. Staple food markets very price inelastic – supply expansion causes price drops \( \rightarrow \) disincentives for farmers to adopt productivity-enhancing tech

2. Informal markets become thinly traded in hunger season \( \rightarrow \) market structure becomes more concentrated \( \rightarrow \) consumers pay more

3. Concentration of marketed surplus, partly due to extreme land disparities
   - rarely do more than 40% of smallholder sell grain in any given year, not because buyers can’t be found, but because of limited productive assets + access to improved tech to produce a marketable surplus.

Main problems with markets

4. Many market failures reflect underlying problems of governance and chronic underinvestment in public goods. High payoffs to public goods (p. 15-17), but often crowded out by large-scale input promotion programs with uncertain payoffs. Vicious cycle \( \rightarrow \) renewed felt need for government interventions

5. *Ad hoc* interventions \( \rightarrow \) highly unpredictable input and output market policy environment \( \rightarrow \) lack of credible commitment necessary to spur private K investment in ag.
What to do?

Take actions to make demand for grain more elastic

1. Investments in road infrastructure
2. Support regional trade
   - Streamline customs clearance procedures
   - Eliminate export bans, import bans, duties on grain between regional neighbors, e.g., among COMESA countries
3. Support development of animal feed industries and alternative end uses

What to do? (2)

4. Provide incentives for banks and private capital to want to invest in staple food markets to serve smallholder farmers
   - Support sale or long-term leasing of existing marketing board storage facilities
   - Underwrite portion of risk involved in private investment in storage facilities

Progress on most of these will require governments to move away from Model 3
Competing models of roles of state and private sector in food markets:

**Model 1**  
Rely on markets  
state role limited to:  
- Public goods investment  
- Regulatory framework  
- Strengthening of institutions / defense of property rights  
- Policies supportive of private sector entry and competition

**Model 2**  
Primary reliance on markets  
- but role for rules-based state operations  
  - e.g., buffer stock release in response to defend stated ceiling price  
  - Marketing board purchases at stated floor price announced in advance  
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**Model 3**  
Role for markets and discretionary state intervention  
- Based on premise that private sector cannot ensure adequate food supplies in response to production shortfalls  
- Justification for unconstrained role for state interventions in markets to correct for market failures

What to do? (3)

4. Work with governments to show that it is in their long-term interests to increasingly adopt Model 1 or 2 in order to view the private sector as an ally in achieving smallholder agricultural growth, not an enemy  
   - Formal govt-private sector consultations  
   - Work out the details of a rules-based approach to government involvement in markets – periodic stakeholder fora
One view of liberalization

“What are you complaining about? It’s a level playing field.”

Number of traders buying maize from farmers in village – 2009 Maize Value Chain Study

![Bar chart showing the number of traders buying maize from farmers in different categories for Kenya and Zambia.](chart.png)
Budget allocation to Agricultural Sector in Zambia: ZMK465 million in 2005

- Personnel Emoluments: 20%
- Operational funds: 11%
- Irrigation Development: 3%
- Infrastructure: 2%
- Food Security Pack & EDRP: 12%
- Food Reserve Agency Maize Marketing: 15%
- Fertilizer Support Program: 37%

Political economy of public resource allocation

- Donor budget support
- Government budget
  - Long-term productive investments: R&D, infrastructure, education, etc.
  - High social payoffs
  - But payoffs come 5-20 later
  - Critical for sustained poverty reduction
  - Immediate political payoffs;
  - Visible support to constituencies
  - Contribution to sustained growth / poverty reduction is unclear
Getting Markets Right: What does this mean?

- Not getting government out of markets
- Changing the *role* of government from direct intervention to supportive investments to make markets work
  - Public goods investment
  - Support development of farmer organizations
  - Policy predictability: Clear, rule-based public operations in markets
  - Credible commitment will enable more sophisticated risk management tools to come on line (e.g. warehouse receipt systems)
  - Greater transparency and consultation needed between private and public sectors

thank you
Fact #4

• Formal sector wages rising faster than food prices (1990-2007) in most of region – reversed in 2008/09
• Why?
  – Food market reform has encouraged rapid investment in informal, small-scale milling and trading networks
  – The informal channel exerts competitive pressure on commercial millers/retailers
Obj. 1 Results - Kenya: Increases in maize and bread purchasing power until 07/08 food price crisis...

![Graph showing maize and bread purchasing power in Kenya.]

Obj. 1 Results - Lusaka: Increases in maize and bread purchasing power until 07/08 food price crisis...

![Graph showing maize and bread purchasing power in Lusaka.]

Note: The graphs show the purchasing power of maize and bread over time, with a focus on the period leading up to the 07/08 food price crisis.
**Obj. 1 Results - Maputo:** Some increases over time in quantities affordable per daily minimum wage; rice and maize meal peaked before the 2007/8 food price crisis.

![Graph showing affordability of food over time](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zambia</th>
<th>Total Income</th>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Landholding size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'000 kwacha per capita</td>
<td>ha per capita</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fertilizer source:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households not acquiring fertilizer:</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash purchases from private retailers:</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Fertilizer Support Program (50% subsidy)</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Role of maize in farm sales revenue is declining (share of gross sales revenue -%) 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Other grains/beans/oilseeds</th>
<th>Non-food cash crops</th>
<th>Fruits -vegs</th>
<th>Animal products</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
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<td>32.3</td>
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<td>44.9</td>
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<td>na</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mozam</td>
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<td>9.3</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major Challenge:

- how best to encourage governments to reallocate public budgets toward crucial investments with long-term payoffs instead of investments with short-term payoffs with limited impact on L.T. development?
- Future of ‘untied’ budget support?
The Way Forward

It is useful to distinguish between:

• “first-order” marketing improvements – which are fundamental pre-conditions for farm productivity growth to occur – and

• “second-order” improvements, which will support small farmer productivity growth as long as the fundamental first-order issues are meaningfully addressed, but which will have only limited impacts if they are not.

The Way Forward (2)

- The fundamental *first-order improvements* revolve around getting the critical middle stages of staple food value chains moving – the wholesaling and processing stages.
  - A competitive wholesaling stage of the value chain tends to give rise to greater investment at the first-buyer (assembly) stage who buy direct from farmers.
  - Wholesalers are an important source of financing and contracting that enable assemblers to more aggressively compete for farm surpluses early in the season when prices are low.
Competing models of roles of state and private sector in food markets:

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What is the right strategy?

- Poulton et al (2006) note that there is no credible government commitment to Model 1 (full liberalization), hence Model 2 (markets with rule-based state operations) is preferred.
- However, questionable whether Model 2 could be perceived as credible either.
- Many countries believe that when it comes to food security only self-sufficiency - not open borders - will offer the lasting solution.
- With low level of trust and commitment problems, Model 3 (ad-hoc interventionism) is likely to become the long-run equilibrium.
- Model 3 has in fact become the dominant model among the main maize-producing countries in the region.
Why does this happen?

- The “commitment problem”
  - The inability of parties to make a *credible commitment* to a course of action that would resolve a conflict
  - Governments need commitment that traders will import sufficient volumes at tolerable prices
  - Traders need a commitment from government not to take sudden, unanticipated actions that affect traders’ bottom line
  - Government can’t make a credible commitment to this effect
    - Rent seeking by individuals in government
    - Lack of trust that traders will import sufficient quantities

Retail sources of consumer staple food expenditures, Nairobi

![Figure 17: Alternative Retail Channels and Levels of Use](image)
Even with 20% annual growth of supermarkets, in relatively progressive Kenya, in 10 years, the supermarket share will be:

12.4% market share in 2016.

Therefore: priority must be on building up the traditional food marketing systems